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AN EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK FOR DIVERSITY AS A 
COMPELLING INTEREST IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
!. INTRODUCTION 
Affirmative action is on trial in America.1 Across the nation, pri-
vate citizens and government bodies are debating its effectiveness, 
benefits, and fairness, especially in the context of higher education. 2 
Many colleges and universities have implemented affirmative action 
policies3 not only to remedy past discrimination, but also to achieve a 
racially and ethnically diverse student body.4 The pursuit of diversitys 
in higher education has engendered considerable controversy.6 Propo-
nents of affirmative action policies that pursue diversity argue that the 
educational, moral, and social benefits of diversity in the academic 
context are compelling and that narrowly tailored affirmative action 
1 See, e.g., Howard Fineman, Affirmative Action, Race & Rage: When Preferences Work -
And Don't, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, !995, at 22, 24 (discussing the affirmative action debate). 
2 For example, this spring Congress is scheduled to consider a bill that would forbid institu-
tions receiving federal funding from implementing affirmative action programs based on race, 
color, national origin, or gender. See Kate Zernike, Tuning in to Congress: High School Students 
Debate Affirmative Action Via Satellite, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. r, 1996, at 17, 20. 
3 Higher education has employed a variety of race-conscious programs and strategies to re-
cruit minority students, including race-conscious financial aid and the recognition of racial back-
grouna as a plus factor in admissions. See William T. '!rent, Student Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education: Addressing Underrepresentation, in THE RACIAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 107, 108-o9 (Philip G. Altbach & Kofi Lomotey eds., 199!). This Note fo-
cuses on the use of race-conscious decisionmaking in admissions decisions. 
4 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 55r, 569-73 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (observing that the 
University of Texas School of Law's affirmative action policy was adopted, among other reasons, 
to remedy past discrimination and to achieve a diverse student body), rev'd, No. 94-50664, 1996 
WL 120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996). The Fifth Circuit handed down its decision in Hopwood as 
this issue was going to press. Therefore this Note does not specifically address the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion. 
5 "Diversity'' has encompassed a variety of meanings in a variety of contexts. In higher edu-
cation, diversity has taken on four meanings: inclusion of underrepresented minorities; institu-
tional climate and responses to intolerance, including student retention, isolation, and harassment; 
mission, i.e., educating students for participation in a diverse society and work environment; and 
transformation, a new understanding of education, teaching, learning, and scholarship informed 
by the inclusion of diverse populations. See Daryl G. Smith, Organizational Implications of Di-
versity in Higher Education, in DIVERSITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 220, 222-28 (Martin M. Chemers, l5tuart Oskamp & Mark A. Costanzo 
eds., 1995). The notion of diversity includes a variety of characteristics and traits, such as race, 
gender, class, culture, physical disability, and age. See JOAN P. SHAPIRO, TREVOR E. SEWELL & 
JOSEPH P. DuCETTE, REFRAMING DIVERSITY IN EDUCATION 1-3 (William J. Bailey ed., !995). 
As the meaning of the term evolved, "affirmative action and a focus on representation and num-
bers became and have remained a fundamental core of the topic of diversity." Smith, supra, at 
223. This Note concentrates on the representational aspect of racial diversity. 
6 See, e.g., ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE?: FOUR CRITICAL YEARS 
REVISITED 429 (!993). 
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policies seeking diversity are therefore constitutional. 7 Opponents con-
tend that, because the benefits of such policies are not compelling, 8 the 
policies violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 and the Four-
teenth Amendment.10 Although Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke 11 declared "the attainment of a 
diverse student body" to be "clearly . . . a constitutionally permissible 
goal for an institution of higher education,"12 a majority of the Court 
did not endorse this determination. A majority of the Justices did 
hold, however, that race may be used as a factor in a university's 
admissions program.13 Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke continues to 
be the guiding opinion for lower courts, and they have accordingly 
treated diversity in the academic context as compelling as a matter of 
law,14 but the approach of the Supreme Court to such nonremedial 
affirmative action and to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke has been 
ambivalent.15 
This Note argues that if courts choose to reexamine evidence on 
the value of diversity in higher education, they should not apply the 
evidentiary requirements that the Supreme Court has applied to cases 
involving questions of past discrimination. Rather, courts should con-
sider the unique nature of diversity in higher education and the pro-
tection afforded the academic context in which the evidence is 
considered and modify their review of the evidence presented accord-
ingly. Furthermore, this Note argues that the interest of an institution 
of higher education16 in diversity is "compelling" in light of the evi-
7 See, e.g., Martin Michaelson, Building a Comprehensive Defense of Affirmative-Action Pro-
grams, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 28, 1995, at A56. 
8 See, e.g., Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv. 759, 773 (1995). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988). 
10 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 970 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
11 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
12 ld. at 3II-I2 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
13 See id. at 320; id. at 326 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
14 See Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 975 (holding that a racial classification adopted for the purpose 
of achieving diversity is constitutional). But see Hopwood v. Texas, No. 94-50664, 1996 WL 
120235, at *Io (sth Cir. Mar. 18, 1996). 
15 Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[A] state interest in the promotion of racial diver-
sity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to 
support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest.'~ with Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Mod-
ern equal protection doctrine has recogni2ed only one [compelling] interest remedying the effects 
of racial discrimination."), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 
(1995). 
16 This Note focuses on the policies of colleges and universities. However, it relies upon cases 
involving challenges to affirmative action policies at the graduate level because these cases are the 
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dence that a racially diverse student body furthers learning.l7 Courts 
should therefore continue to treat diversity as compelling as a matter 
of law. 
Part II reviews the Supreme Court's constitutional framework for 
analyzing affirmative action programs. Part ill argues that the evi-
dentiary requirements the Court has developed in determining whether 
an entity has presented sufficient evidence of past discrimination to 
warrant a race-conscious remedy should not be applied to universities 
that adopt affirmative action to achieve diversity. Part IV examines 
the influence of race on experience and discusses some of the recent 
evidence of the benefits of diversity in higher education. 
II. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena18 unequivocally stated that "all racial classifications, imposed 
by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be ana-
lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored mea-
sures that further compelling governmental interests."19 Because the 
many private colleges and universities that receive federal funding are 
regulated by Title VI,20 and state colleges and universities are regu-
lated as state actors by the Fourteenth Amendment, these institutions 
are subject to constitutional limitations in enacting race-conscious 
classifications. 21 
In examining the purpose of a racial classification, the Court has 
scrutinized the evidence in support of the classification under a height-
ened evidentiary standard. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,22 the plurality applied strict scrutiny to a preferential layoff 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement under which the school 
only ones to date in which educational institutions have defended their affirmative action policies 
by noting their compelling interest in diversity. 
17 Racial diversity in higher education also serves numerous additional interests, including the 
national interest in reducing the disparities in educational attainment between whites and 
America's rapidly growing minority population. See THE COMM'N ON MINORITY PARTICIPATION 
IN EDUC. AND AM. LIFE, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUC., ONE-THIRD OF A NATION 1-6 (1988). 
18 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
19 ld. at 2113. 
20 Title VI forbids recipients of federal funding from discriminating on the basis of race, color, 
or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2ooo(d) (1988). 
21 The Court has interpreted Title VI to allow affirmative action policies that use racial and 
ethnic classifications if those classifications are permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. 
See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 61o-11 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.); id. at 352 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, ]J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
22 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
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board laid off :rionminority teachers before minority teachers with less 
seniority.23 The Court did not consider the school district's goal of 
reducing the effects of societal discrimination by providing role models 
for minority students to be a compelling interest. 24 Furthermore, the 
Court concluded that the school board's preferential layoff policy 
could not survive equal protection analysis unless the lower court 
found that the school district "had a strong basis in evidence for its 
conclusion that remedial action was necessary."25 
The Court applied this "strong basis in evidence" standard in City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,26 in which Richmond argued that it 
had adopted its race-based set-aside in order to remedy past discrimi-
nation against minority subcontractors. 27 In holding the program un-
constitutional, the Court rejected the city's evidentiary showing of past 
discrimination on the grounds that the evidence failed to show particu-
larized past discrimination by the city itself and thus left uncertain the 
scope of the proper local remedy.28 The Court noted that the testi-
mony of the plan's proponents about racial discrimination inflicted in 
the "area, and the State, and around the nation" and congressional 
findings of "nationwide discrimination in the construction industry" 
were insufficiently probative of discrimination in Richmond.29 Finally, 
the Court strongly eschewed as "unprecedented" Justice Marshall's 
suggestion that findings of discrimination could be adopted from other 
jurisdictions. 30 
The Court thus appears committed to scrutinizing the evidence 
presented in support of racial classifications closely and requiring, at 
least when the goal of the affirmative action scheme is remedial, a 
"strong basis in evidence." In light of these evidentiary requirements, 
how should courts review evidence of a university's interest in 
diversity? 
ill. THE PROPER EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWING THE 
COMPELLING NATURE OF DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
In applying the "strong basis in evidence" standard for establishing 
past discrimination, the Court has adopted two requirements: the insti-
tution must make a particularized showing of past discrimination 
(which demonstrates the necessity for remedial action), and this show-
23 See id. at 2 7o-73 (plurality opinion). 
24 See id. at 2 74-76. 
25 Id. at 277 (emphasis added). The Court did not reach the question whether the school 
district had a strong basis in evidence for its past discrimination. See id. at 2 78-84. 
26 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
27 See id. at 498-soo. 
28 See id. at 498, sos. 
29 ld. at soo, 504. 
30 See id. at sos. 
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ing must establish a limit to the scope and duration .of race-conscious 
decisionmaking. 31 
These evidentiary requirements should not be applied to universi-
ties that seek to achieve the future benefits of a diverse student body. 
Certainly, "[t]he point of carefully examining the interest asserted by 
the government in support of a racial classification, and the evidence 
offered to show that the classification is needed, is precisely. to distin-
guish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental deci-
sionmaking."32 Nevertheless, the application of the Court's evidentiary 
requirements for present effects of past discrimination is not necessary 
to guarantee careful examination of the proffered interest. 
If the Court's adoption of strict scrutiny is not to be "strict in the-
ory but fatal in fact,"33 the Court's evidentiary requirements must be 
sensitive to the nature of the interest considered. The benefits of di-
versity are the result of interactions between individuals. Although the 
educational community has heralded diversity's benefits, current social 
science methods do not provide definitive measurements. Therefore, if 
courts did require universities to prove that diversity furthers learning, 
courts would be making a substantive choice that higher educational 
institutions cannot pursue diversity. 
Rather than preventing universities from seeking the educational 
benefits of diversity, courts should find the testimony of educators suf-
ficient to establish these benefits. Educators have sufficient day-to-day 
interaction with the educational process to provide the careful exami-
nation the Court seeks. Their testimony is particularly vital and per-
suasive in light of the Court's protection of academic freedom. "The 
courts should intrude no further into the educational process, of which 
admissions is an integral part, than is absolutely necessary in order to 
assure that constitutional principles are guaranteed. "34 Therefore, in 
the context of diversity in higher education, a court's interpretive 
framework for the application of the "strong basis in evidence" stan-
dard35 should be informed by the nature of diversity and the First 
Amendment interest in academic freedom. 
3l See id. at 497-505. 
32 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, II5 S. Ct 2097, 2II3 (1995). 
33 Id. at 2II7 (quoting Fullilove v. Klut2nick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1g8o) (Marshall, J., 
concurring)). 
34 Winton W. Manning, The Pursuit of Fairness in Admissions to Higher Education, in THE 
CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A SUMMARY OF REPORTS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 381, 384 (1980) [hereinafter THE CARNEGIE COUNCIL C>N POLICY STUDIES IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION]. 
35 In light of the Court's application of strict scrutiny to all racial classifications and its indi-
cation that a careful examination of the interest asserted is necessary to distinguish legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of race-conscious decisionmaking, the Court is likely to apply this evidentiary 
standard to all race-conscious measures. 
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A. The Nature of Diversity 
The nature of a university's interest in a diverse student body ren-
ders the Court's evidentiary requirements for demonstrating past dis-
crimination inapposite to affirmative action admissions policies 
instituted in pursuit of diversity. The benefits of diversity are the re-
sult of h:~terpersonal interactions that cannot be quantified or verified 
by scientific proof. Such benefits do not accrue every day to every 
student and may even go undetected by the students and participants 
involved. Therefore, a university would face insurmountable obstacles 
if it had to "prove" the benefits of diversity using current methodolo-
gies. For example, sociologists confront tremendous difficulties in eval-
uating the impact of any factor, including diversity, on students in 
higher education.36 These difficulties include the problem of separat-
ing the influence of students' backgrounds from the h:npact of college 
experiences on college outcomes.37 Although researchers can draw 
"causal inferences" from correlational data, studies cannot prove that 
any one college experience or environmental factor causes a particular 
result.38 Therefore, although research demonstrates a positive correla-
tion between diversity and learning,39 research cannot prove that di-
versity furthers learning. 
B. A Particularized Showing 
Unlike the defenders of affirmative action policies that attempt to 
remedy past discrh:nination, a university should not be required to 
make a particularized showing that diversity furthers learning4° at its 
institution.41 First, whereas the necessity for a remedy addressing the 
present effects of past discrh:nination by an institution may depend on 
the extent of that discrh:nination, the value of diversity is not depen-
dent upon the unique behavior of particular individuals a_t an institu-
tion. Rather, the increased learning that occurs through diversity is 
36 See, e.g., ALEXANDER \V. AsTIN, ASSESSMENT FOR EXCELLENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND 
PRACTICE OF AsSESSMENT AND EVALUATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 81 (1993); HOWARD R. 
BOWEN, INvESTMENT IN LEARNING: THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL VALUE OF AMERICAN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 22-29 (1977); ERNEST T. PASCARELLA & PATRICK T. TERENZINI1 HOW 
COLLEGE AFFECTS STUDENTS: FINDINGS AND INSIGHTS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF RESEARCH 
565-66, 657---{)1 (1991). 
37 See PASCARELLA & TERENZINI, supra note 36, at 658-59. 
38 AsTIN, supra note 6, at xv-xvi; see also KENNETH A. FELDMAN & THEODORE M. NEW· 
COMB, THE IMPACT OF COLLEGE ON STUDENTS 48-49 (1994) ("College impacts have not been 
documented directly but only inferred from observed freshman-senior differences."). 
39 See infra p. 1373. 
40 However, a court will inquire whether the university in fact seeks to attain the benefits of a 
diverse student body. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, 598 P.2d 707, 713 n.8 (Wash. 1979). 
41 In a nonuniversity context, the Fourth Circuit required Charlotte, North Carolina, to 
demonstrate that it had a particularized need for diversity. See Hayes v. North State Law En-
forcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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rooted in the overall interaction of individuals across differences.42 
Second, a particularized showing requirement could produce anoma-
lous results. Some universities might be unable to pursue diversity 
simply because they lack sufficient resources to prove that diversity 
furthers learning.43 Also, the requirement of a particularized showing 
would inappropriately divert the scarce resources of our nation's edu-
cational institutions44 to proving the benefits of diversity. Finally, if a 
court required an institution to produce particularized evidence of the 
benefits of diversity, the very empirical studies produced as a result 
might be unreliable. The commencement of such studies in connection 
with affirmative action litigation is likely to distort the results. Educa-
tional specialists have noted that "[r]esearch on diversity is by its na-
ture sensitive, prone to undetected bias, and open to multiple 
interpretations."45 Therefore, the Court's present refusal to rely on ev-
identiary findings drawn from other jurisdictions46 is inappropriate in 
a case concerning diversity in higher education. 
C. Limited in Scope and Duration 
The Court has also required that institutions use particularized 
findings of past discrimination to limit the scope and duration of race-
conscious decisionmaking.47 This requirement ensures that the relief 
adopted seeks to redress the precise injury complained of rather than 
to justify race-conscious decisionmaking "limitless in scope and dura-
tion."48 Although the Court has sought to limit the scope of remedial 
affirmative action programs, a university's interest in racial diversity 
should embrace the interaction of all races. Therefore, a university 
should exclude from its affirmative action program only those appli-
cants whose race is adequately represented without affirmative action. 
42 Justice Powell implicitly recognized this fact in Bakke, in which he drew upon statements 
from educators at different institutions. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
3I6-I8 (I978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Similarly, in Hopwood the district court accepted testimony 
from deans of various law schools on the institutional value of a diverse student body. See Hop-
wood v. Texas, 86I F. Supp. 55I, 57I (W.D. Tex. I994), rev'd, No. 94-50664, I996 WL I20235 
(5th Cir. Mar. IS, I996). 
43 Furthermore, "[i]nstitutions find it difficult to invest scarce time and resources on such vol-
atile and agoni2ing issues at any time and especially now when the fundamental instruction, re-
search, and public services of colleges and universities are being challenged." Marsha J. Hirano-
Nakanishi, Methodological Issues in the Study of Diversity in Higher Education, in STUDYING 
DIVERSITY IN HiGHER EDUCATION 63, 65 (Daryl G. Smith, Lisa E. Wolf & Thomas Levitan eds., 
I994) (hereinafter STUDYING DIVERSITY]. 
44 See Patrick M. Callan, Government and Higher Education, in HIGHER LEARNING IN 
AMERICA: 1980-2000, at 3, II-I3 (Arthur Levine ed., I993) [hereinafter HIGHER LEARNING IN 
AMERICA]. 
45 Daryl G. Smith, Lisa E. Wolf & Thomas Levitan, Introduction to Studying Diversity: Les-
sons From the Field, in STUDYING DIVERSITY, supra note 43, at I, 5· 
46 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989). 
47 See id. at 497-98. 
48 ld. at 498. 
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In addition, a university's pursuit of learning is everlasting; therefore, 
if the Court accepts the opinion of educators that diversity furthers 
learning, race-conscious decisionmaking should be permitted as long as 
race-blind decisionmaking is not achieving diversity. The pursuit of 
diversity would remain a compelling interest until race is no longer a 
powerful influence on individual experiences (or is no longer suffi-
ciently salient that its inclusion in education furthers learning). Clearly 
this day has not arrived.49 
D. The Testimony of Educators 
Because diversity in higher education is not susceptible to direct 
proof, courts must rely on the testimony of educators regarding the 
benefits of diversity. Educators have witnessed firsthand the benefits 
that diverse student bodies bring to their educational institutions over 
time. Such individuals are extremely knowledgeable about the learn-
ing process and the complexity of its functioning inside and outside of 
the classroom. 
The Court's protection of academic freedom recognizes the experi-
ence and expertise of educators on academic matters and the corre-
sponding deference due their opinions. Academic freedom in higher 
education protects two distinct, and sometimes conflicting, interests. 
First, academic freedom encompasses the First Amendment rights of 
"teachers and students [who] must always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, to _gain new maturity and understanding. "5° 
Second, academic freedom protects "autonomous decisionmaking by 
the academy itsel£."51 Although these two theories of academic free-
dom are often in conflict, the intimate connection between them is evi-
dent in Justice Powell's oft-quoted discussion in Bakke of the '"four 
essential freedoms' of a university - to determine for itself on aca-
demic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study."52 In recognizing both 
forms of academic freedom, the Court has attempted to protect "the 
atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation' ... so essential 
to the quality of higher education."53 Individual and institutional aca-
demic freedom are closely related because interference in institutional 
49 Although many would argue that this day will never arrive, see, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & 
HOWARD \VINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 19605 TO THE 
1990s, at 5 (2d. ed. 1994) {"Race will always be at the center of the American experience.'?, or 
should never arrive, see, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. 
L. REv. I06o, 1062 (I99I), a judicial declaration of its arrival is not inconceivable. 
so Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (I957)). 
51 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985). 
52 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)). 
53 /d. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)). 
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academic freedom could impair individuals' ability to engage in pro-
tected intellectual pursuits. · 
However, this "principle of respect for legitimate academic deci-
sionmaking"54 is not absolute. As Justice Powell admonished in 
Bakke, "[a]lthough a university must have wide discretion in making 
the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional 
limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded."55 For 
example, in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission,56 the Court rejected the University of Penn-
sylvania's assertion in a Title VII case that academic freedom 
necessitated the continued confidentiality of peer review materials.57 
Nevertheless, the Court has repeatedly stated that it will not inter-
fere in those decisions it considers "academic." For instance, even as it 
rejected the University of Pennsylvania's academic freedom claim, the 
Court took pains to underscore the "principle of respect for legitimate 
academic decisionmaking."58 The Court noted that, unlike the Univer-
sity of California in Bakke, the University of Pennsylvania did not 
claim that considerations of race, sex, and national origin constituted 
"academic grounds" for choosing professors. 59 
Since Bakke, the Supreme Court has emphasized that academic de-
cisions are subject only to a "narrow avenue of judicial review."60 
Although academic institutions' disciplinary decisions are properly 
subject to judicial review,61 the Court has noted that judges must re-
main cognizant of the "importance of avoiding second:.guessing of le-
gitimate academic judgments."62 Judges are not equipped to second-
guess the substance of academic decisions because such decisions "re-
quire 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not 
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative 
decisionmaking. '"63 
A university's admissions decision is an example of such an aca-
demic decision. Students are admitted on the basis of the university's 
assessment of their ability to contribute to the fulfillment of the insti-
tution's mission.64 Such decisions consider a variety of objective and 
nonobjective factors, including test scores, intellectual pursuits, and 
54 University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) (emphasis omitted). 
55 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
56 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
57 See id. at 199-201. 
58 Id. at 199. 
59 Id. at 198 n.7. 
60 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227 (1985). 
61 See Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85-91 (1978). 
62 University of Pa., 493 U.S. at rgg. 
63 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at go). 
64 See BOWEN, supra note 36, at 15; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each According to His Ability, 
From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 6o 
B.U. L. REv. 815, 872 (1980). 
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potential contributions to society. The complexity and subjectivity of 
the admissions process thus require academic judgments to which 
courts should defer.6s 
IV. THE CONTRIBUTION OF RAciAL DIVERSITY TO HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
In light of the evidentiary framework that courts should use when 
considering whether diversity is a compelling interest in higher educa-
tion, what contribution does racial diversity make to higher education? 
To answer this question, this Part examines the influence of race on 
experience and perspective to demonstrate how racial diversity con-
tributes to the mission of higher education. 
A. The Impact of Race on Experience and Perspective 
In American society, race66 powerfully influences an individual's 
life experiences.67 Career attainment,68 neighborhood composition,69 
family structure,7° and personal associations71 vary across different 
65 One repeated objection to this academic freedom argument is that, taken to its extreme, it 
could be employed by an institution arguing for homogeneity. See Kent Greenawalt, The Un-
resolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L. REv. 87, 124-25 (1979). If certain insti-
tutions with nondiverse student bodies, such as all women's colleges, further "the robust exchange 
of ideas," whether these institutions could successfully invoke academic freedom to protect the 
pursuit of such student body compositions remains an open question. See, e.g., Julius Stone, 
Equal Protection in Special Admissions Programs: Forward from Bakke, 6 HASTINGS CaNST. 
L.Q. 719, 747-48 (1979) (arguing that only admissions policies that seek diversity as a means to 
promote the "robust exchange" of ideas are protected by the First Amendment). 
66 An exploration of the meaning of race is beyond the scope of this Note; however, numerous 
sources have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 
613 (1987) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits discrimination against a person "because he or 
she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo 
sapiens"); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923) (asserting that the physi-
cal characteristics of Hindus readily distinguish them from whites and that "the great body of our 
people instinctively ... reject the thought of their assimilation"); Christopher A. Ford, Adminis-
tering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 
1239-40 (1994) (explaining the indeterminacy of racial classifications). 
67 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 49, at to66-72; Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative 
Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 862 (1995). 
68 See, e.g., THE AsiAN AMERICAN ALMANAC: A REFERENCE WORK ON ASIANS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 507 (Susan Gall ed., 1995); FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM'N, GOOD FOR BUS!· 
NESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 19 (1995) (reporting that execu-
tives, managers, and administrators in business services are disproportionately white). 
69 See Robert D. Bullard & Charles Lee, Racism and American Apartheid, in RESIDENTIAL 
APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY I, I (Robert D. Bullard, J. Eugene Grigsby, ill & Charles 
Lee eds., I994). 
70 See FRANK D. BEAN & MARTA TIENDA, THE HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 203 (1987); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, 
UNEQUAL 24I (Ballantine Books 1995) (1992); Cardell K. Jacobson, Introduction and Overview, 
in AMERICAN FAMILIES: ISSUES IN RACE AND ETHNICITY I, 3 (Cardell K. Jacobson ed., 1995), 
71 See Glenn Loury, The Saliency of Race, in SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA 
75, 75 (Peter Collier & David Horowitz eds., I991) ("And, in our own lives, in the sphere of 
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races. "[A]t the level of experience, of everyday life, race is an almost 
indissoluble part of our identities."72 The abundant testimony of indi-
viduals73 and numerous studies have documented this reality. For ex-
ample, a I99I study of the purchase prices obtained at retail car 
dealerships revealed that, even after controlling for bargaining pat-
terns, black females paid three times the markup charged to white 
males and black men paid more than twice the markup charged to 
white males.74 The results of this experiment and others "illuminate 
the minute, day-to-day interactions within which racial dynamics are 
played out in individual lives."75 
The influence of race on experience is not confined to racial minor-
ities -it extends to whites as well.76 Whites often underestimate the 
impact of their race and the race of others. 77 "To be born white is to 
be free from confronting race on a daily, personal, interaction-by-inter-
action basis."78 The experiences of whites in America are qualitatively 
different from those of nonwhites.79 For example, whites and blacks 
generally view race relations in America in very different terms: whites 
point to the continuing decline of racial discrimination, whereas blacks 
continue to be dismayed by racial barriers.80 The positive value of 
associations that define our personal identities, in our own social behavior, we make racial dis-
tinctions readily, daily, in terms of whom we befriend and whom we embrace."). 
72 Michael Omi & Howard Winant, On the Theoretical Concept of Race, in RAcE, IDENTITY 
AND REPRESENTATION IN EDUCATION 3, 5 (Cameron McCarthy & Warren Crichlow eds., 1993); 
see also HACKER, supra note 70, at 53 (noting that for blacks in America "[t]he day-to-day aggra-
vations and humiliations add up bit by bitter bit''); PASCARELLA & TERENZINI, supra note 36, at 
166-68 (discussing recent research on black identity development). 
73 See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW 
PROFESSOR 56-57 (1991). 
74 See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 
104 HARV. L. REv. 817, 823-24, 828 (1991). 
75 jENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION: FACING UP TO 
THE AMERICAN DREAM u6-17 (1995) (summari2ing experiments demonstrating that race often 
determines how individuals interact). 
76 Because most white ethnics do not have readily distinguishable traits, they have been able 
to assimilate into the mainstream population. See, e.g., United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 
U.S. 204, 215 (1923) ("The children of English, French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other 
European parentage, quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive 
hallmarks of their European origin."). 
77 See HACKER, supra note 70, at 10. 
78 Aleinikoff, supra note 49, at 1066. 
79 See AMERICAN COMMITMENTS INITIATIVE, ASSOCI(\TION OF AM. COLLEGES AND UNIVS., 
AMERICAN PLURALISM AND THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM: HIGHER EDUCATION IN A DIVERSE DE-
MOCRACY 4 (1995) [hereinafter AMERICAN PLURALISM] ("Those marked out by racial, ethnic, eco-
nomic, or other forms of marginalized diversity have not had the same kinds of experience with 
United States society as those who identify with and are readily accepted by the dominant Euro-
pean-American cultural and socioeconomic communities."); see also Roger Wilkins, Racism Has 
Its Privileges, THE NATION, Mar. 27, 1995, at 409, 410 ("Blacks and whites experience America 
very differently. Though we often inhabit the same space, we operate in very different psychic 
spheres."). 
80 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 75, at 6o, 68. 
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whiteness to whites is demonstrated by the statements of white stu-
dents who maintained that they would have to be compensated $1 
million dollars a year to give up their racial identities and become Af-
rican-Americans for fifty years. 81 
Some argue that the influence of race on experience is predomi-
nantly a phenomenon of the past. When individual experiences and 
interests do diverge, the argument goes, they tend to differ more along 
class lines than racial lines.82 Although powerful differences exist 
within races along class lines, 83 prosperity does not erase the impact of 
race in individuals' lives.84 Members of the black middle and upper 
class repeatedly testify to the continuing impact of race.85 "The Black 
elite experience race on an individual level . . . . Despite their statuses, 
privileges, and successes, they [are] still Black in a racist society,"86 
and must confront the daily realities of glass ceilings, alienation and 
isolation, and negative perceptions about blacks that delay or prevent 
professional progress.87 Consequently, the black professional class ex-
ists "as a group that has no real home - abandoned or ostracized by 
other blacks and resented or rejected by whites."88 Therefore, 
although individuals of any race may achieve economic success, "legal 
reforms brought about by the civil rights movement have not solved 
the problem of the color line."89 
81 See HACKER, supra note 70, at 35-36. 
82 See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON 
CAMPUS 231 (First Vintage Books 1992) (1991) ("[M]ost American students seem to display strik-
ing agreement on all the basic questions of life.'?; Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case and the 
Future of "Affirmative Action", 67 CAL. L. REv. 171, 181 (1979) ("A light-skinned black of upper 
middle-class background may resemble a Southern European more than the latter resembles a 
Swede; more important, he may have experiences, values, aspirations, tastes, speech, and manners 
that are substantially the same as those of his white peers."). 
83 See HOCHSCHILD1 supra note 75, at 6o. 
84 See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RAciSM 6-7 (1992) ("[N]either professional status nor relatively high income protects even accom-
plished blacks from capricious acts of discrimination that may reflect either individual 'prefer-
ence' or an institution's bias."). 
85 See, e.g., HocHSCHILD, supra note 75, at 93 ("Unlike whites, for whom socioeconomic sta-
tus is closely associated with subjective quality of life, blacks do not eA"J)ress greater happiness or 
more satisfaction with their life as their economic position improves."); WILLIAMS, supra note 73 1 
at 44-51 (1991) (describing how the author was barred from entering a clothing store in New 
York because she was black). 
86 LOIS BENJAMIN, THE BLACK ELITE: FACING THE COLOR LINE IN THE TWILIGHT OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY at xxiv (1991). 
87 See id. at 13-14, 96-1n. 
88 LAWRENCE 0. GRAHAM, MEMBER OF THE CLUB: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE IN A RACIALLY 
POLARIZED WORLD at xiv (1995). 
89 Evelyn Hu-DeHart, Rethinking America: The Practice and Politics of Multiculturalism in 
Higher Education, in BEYOND A DREAM DEFERRED: MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION AND THE 
POLITICS OF EXCELLENCE 3, 6 (Becky W. Thompson & Sangeeta 1}ragi eds., 1993) [hereinafter 
BEYOND A DREAM DEFERRED]. 
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Race also affects perspective. "[O]ne's own particular inheritances 
and experiences form an interpretive framework both for the construc-
tion of identity and for all further learning."9° Numerous studies of 
jury behavior have illustrated that race influences jurors' viewpoints: 
"their life experiences condition their view of the evidence, and that 
view in turn influences their verdict."91 The O.J. Simpson trial is a 
recent example of the influence of race on interpretive framework. 
Blacks were more likely to believe the evidence of police misconduct, 
tampering, and racism presented in the O.J. Simpson trial.92 This trial 
is only one of many examples of the influence of race on individual 
perceptions. 93 
B. The Contribution of Racial Diversity to Higher Education 
In their selection processes, most universities seek to identify and 
enroll students "whose traits will be compatible with the programs and 
purposes of the institution."94 American colleges and universities serve 
a variety of functions, including teaching, research, and public ser-
vice,95 but the pursuit of these goals is united by a common process-
learning. 96 To determine who will best contribute to this common pro-
cess, institutions dealing with a large volume of applications often use 
proxies. "Inevitably, applicants for admission must be treated as par-
tial persons, as repositories of formal credentials."97 Most colleges seek 
to evaluate applicants on the basis of numerous factors, such as stan-
dardized test scores, character, and social responsibility.98 After an ad-
missions committee identifies candidates who meet the minimal 
90 AMERICAN PLURALISM, supra note 79, at 21j see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE 
DoUBTS III (1996) (''All people - white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Jewish, male, female, gay, het-
erosexual- view the world through the prism of their experiences."). 
91 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 90, at II3. 
92 See id. at II3-14. 
93 Some commentators argue that race does not further diversity because race is not a good 
proxy for different viewpoints. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 775. However, proponents of di-
versity do not argue that racial minorities contribute a particular position on a particular issue; 
rather, they claim that individuals from different races contribute a viewpoint informed by a 
variety of racial experiences. 
94 BOWEN, supra note 36, at 15. 
95 See ASSOCIATION OF AM. COLLEGES, INTEGRITY IN THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM 4 (1985); 
BOWEN, supra note 36, at 7-8; ERNEST L. BOYER & FRED M. HECHINGER, HIGHER LEARNING 
IN THE NATION'S SERVICE 13 {I98I)j Kenneth D. Benne, The Idea of a University in I965, in 
THE UNIVERSITY IN THE AMERICAN FUTURE I, 8 (Thomas B. Stroup ed., I966); Calvin B.T. Lee, 
Whose Goals for American Higher Education?, in WHOSE GOALS FOR AMERICAN HIGHER EDU-
CATION? I, 4 (Charles G. Dobbins & Calvin B.T. Lee eds., I968). 
96 See BOWEN, supra note 36, at 8; NATHAN M. PuSEY, THE AGE OF THE SCHOLAR: OBSER-
VATIONS ON EDUCATION IN A TROUBLED DECADE I65 (I963); RUDOLPH H. WEINGARTNER, UN-
DERGRADUATE EDUCATION: GOALS AND MEANS IOI (I993). 
97 Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. 
REv. 21, 55 (1979). 
98 See JOHN A. BLACKBURN, AsSESSMENT AND EVALUATION IN ADMISSION 13-I4, I7-18 
(I990). 
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standards for admission, information on the race of an applicant can 
assist an admissions committee in creating a student body that will 
best serve the goals of the institution. 99 A report published by the 
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education explains that 
"[r]ace is relevant [in admissions] because it represents not mere skin 
color, but the consequences of the minority racial experience in 
America."100 
In the classroom, professors can use the backgrounds and exper-
iences of other students as a learning tool.101 Students "come to 'un-
derstand' primarily on the basis of their own reflecting experience, 
into which they seek to incorporate the new ideas they encounter in 
their courses."102 Because their experiences determine their frame of 
reference, minority students bring the influence of these experiences to 
99 See Selective Admissions in Higher Education: Public Policy and Academic Policy, in THE 
CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 341 at II41 II6-17. 
Although some may argue that institutional efforts to increase diversity subvert meritocratic 
principles, this argument incorrectly assumes that, apart from race, university admissions focus 
solely on academic achievement. However, "[a]dmissions policies of institutions of higher educa-
tion have always reflected different levels of preparation between students." Daryl G. Smith, The 
Challenge of Diversity: Implications for Institutional Research, in THE EFFECT OF ASSESSMENT 
ON MINORITY STUDENT PARTICIPATION 53 1 63 (Michael T. Nettles ed., 1990). For example, ath· 
letes and the children of alumni axe often given preferential treatment. See, e.g., Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (noting that higher 
educational institutions have given preferences to athletes, the children of alumni, the affluent, 
and those connected with celebrities and the powerful); Fallon, supra note 64, at 870. In fact, "fax 
more" white students have entered the top ten elite colleges and universities through alumni pref· 
erences than the total of all African-Americans and Chicanos who have gained admission through 
affirmative action. See 'froy Duster, The Diversity of California at Berkeley: An Emerging Refor-
mulation of "Competence" in an Increasingly Multicultural World, in BEYOND A DREAM DE-
FERRED, supra note 89, at 231, 245. In addition, although universities undoubtedly consider prior 
academic performance and test scores, the concept of merit in higher education has most often 
focused on the ability of a student to contribute to the fulfillment of the institution's mission 
rather than simply on "objective" factors. See Fallon, supra note 64, at 872. Therefore, if an 
institution seeks to attain the benefits of a diverse student body, consideration of an applicant's 
race, along with other factors, is in fact a consideration of merit. 
100 Manning, supra note 34, at 383; see also Blasi, supra note 97 1 at 43-46 ("[R]ace is distinc-
tive in one respect members of minority races add an important element that would otherwise be 
almost totally missing, and that is not the case for applicants who axe . . • Southerners, in their 
thirties, or poor."). Justice Powell referred to the \Vinton Manning essay in Bakke. See Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 n.so (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
For a discussion of which differences should matter and why, see Brest & Oshige, supra note 
67, at 877-98, and Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of 
"Diversity", 1996 WIS. L. REv. 105, 138-142, 153-61. 
101 See Pat Hutchings & Allen Wutzdorff, Experiential Learning Across the Curl'iculum: As-
sumptions and Principles, in KNOWING AND DOING: LEARNING THROUGH EXPERIENCE 51 IO 
(Pat Hutchings & Allen Wutzdorff eds., 1988); Kenneth Keniston & Mark Gerzon, Htcman and 
Social Benefits, in UNIVERSAL HIGHER EDUCATION: COSTS AND BENEFITS 371 41 (American 
Council on Educ. ed., 1971) (noting that professors can teach students by "expos[ing] students to 
multiple and conflicting perspectives on themselves and their society"). 
102 JOHN D. WILSON, STUDENT LEARNING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 29 (1981); see also 
CHARLES W. ANDERSON, PRESCRIBING THE LIFE OF THE MIND So (1993) ("[W]e all see things 
from a particular point of view and for a particular purpose.'~. 
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assignments and discussions. Student "encounter[s] with contemporar-
ies [who have] different backgrounds ... and values can ... lead to 
challenge, self-questioning and informal learning which promotes 
moral and intellectual development."103 Although professors may not 
expect all students to reach the same conclusions, "[i]n any field, there 
is no other way to teach adjudicational reasoning than to confront stu-
dents with dilemmas and predicaments, with diverse theories and per-
spectives, and ask them which should prevail, and why."104 
Consequently, students become both recipients of an education and 
contributors to the education of their fellow students.10s 
The learning process also extends beyond the confines of the class-
room.106 When a student arrives on campus, he "interacts with his 
fellow students, exerting influence upon them and they upon him. 
Through such interplay, a student subculture evolves that becomes an 
influential source of change for all the individuals who are inducted 
into it."~07 The diverse experiences of minority students contribute to 
the learning process because "all students stand to benefit from the 
chance to live and work with classmates of other races who can offer 
differing attitudes and experiences that will challenge and inform 
others."108 This type of interaction is one important means through 
which students learn and reorient their beliefs.109 
103 WILSON, supra note 1021 at 85 (citing WILLIAM G. PERRY, FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL AND 
ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE YEARS: A SCHEME (1970), and D.H. HEATH, THE 
REASONABLE ADVENTURER (1964)); see also ELIZABETH K. MINNICH, AMERICAN COMMITMENTS 
NAT1L PANEL, LIBERAL LEARNING AND THE ARTS OF CONNECTION FOR THE NEW ACADEMY 33 
(1995) (noting that individuals improve their thinking abilities when they consider possibilities 
beyond their own communities). 
104 ANDERSON, supra note 1021 at III. 
lOS As professors adapt to teaching diverse populations, increased instructional flexibility will 
provide more effective teaching, "increasing the likelihood of matching learning differences for all 
students." Linda S. Marchesani & Maurianne Adams, Dynamics of Diversity in the Teaching-
Learning Process: A FacuUy Development Model for Analysis and Action, in PROMOTING DIVER-
SITY IN COLLEGE CLASSROOMS: INNOVATIVE RESPONSES FOR THE CURRICULUM, FACULTY AND 
INSTITUTIONS 9, 17 (Maurianne Adams ed., 1992); see also James A. Anderson & Maurianne 
Adams, Acknowledging the Learning Styles of Diverse Student Populations: Implications for In-
structional Design, in TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY 19, 31 (Laura L.B. Border & Nancy Van Note 
Chism eds., 1992) (noting that as institutions focus on maximizing performance for diverse stu-
dents both traditional and nontraditional students will benefit). 
106 See DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN 
UNIVERSITY 97 (1982) C'Surveys of graduating classes have repeatedly shown that seniors believe 
that they have benefited as much from contact with one another as they have from their readings 
and lectures."). 
107 BOWEN, supra note 36, at 13. 
108 BoK, supra note 106, at 98--99. 
109 See FELDMAN & NEWCOMB, supra note 38, at 248 C'Individual students are influenced by 
the total body of their campus peers, which provides both standards for self-judgment and norms 
of 'proper' attitudes and behavior.'~; PASCARELLA & TERENZINl, supra note 36, at 27o-83, 328 
(discussing the findings of many studies demonstrating the significant impact of attending college 
on student values and attitudes and noting that relationships with faculty and other students 
appear to have a greater influence than a student's academic major); Benne, supra note 95, at 38 
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Educators have recognized the educational contributions of racial 
diversity.11° For example, the President of Dartmouth College, James 
Freedman, recently defined diversity on university campuses as "a 
richness of people coming together from a variety of backgrounds, 
bringing to the environment of the college points of view that neces-
sarily are different because of the differences in the backgrounds of the 
members of the student body."111 Moreover, Freedman explained that 
"[ w ]e need a greater variety of people on our campuses, from a greater 
variety of backgrounds, coming together from their differences in order 
to help each of them to educate others."112 Similarly, Harvard Univer-
sity's President, Neil Rudenstine, recently issued a report tracing the 
history of diversity at Harvard and discussing the contribution of di-
versity to learning:ns 
[T]he "measure of a class" consists largely in "how much its members are 
likely to learn from each other - the real beginning of learning, both 
intellectually and emotionally." The range of undergraduate "interests, 
talents, backgrounds and career goals affects importantly the educational 
experience of our students," because "a diverse student body is an educa-
tional resource of coordinate importance with our faculty and our library, 
laboratory and housing arrangements."114 
Rudenstine also explained that "[s]uch diversity is not an end in itself, 
or a pleasant but dispensable accessory. It is the substance from 
which much human learning, understanding, and wisdom derive. It 
offers one of the most powerful ways of creating the intellectual energy 
("[T]he important reorientations in our own lives took place through interpersonal encounters. 
New values grew through significant new associations with people who were different from our-
selves in some way and who were willing to grant us access to their inner worlds."}; cf. Philip G. 
Altbach, Students: Interests, Culture and Activism, in HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA, supra 
note 44, at 203, 212-13 (noting that student organizations may often have more influence on 
student values than the curriculum or professors). 
Some commentators suggest that because minority students are isolated on campus, see, e.g., 
D'SouzA, supra note 82, at 233-34, increased learning through diversity does not occur in prac-
tice. There are three responses to this argument. First, even if students never interact outside of 
the classroom, students do interact in the classroom. See Robert M. O'Neil, Bakke in Balance: 
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 CAL. L. REv. 143, 160 (1979). Second, students often underesti-
mate the amount of interaction between races outside of the classroom. See Arthur Levine, Di-
versity on Campus, in HiGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 333, 336. Finally, if 
racial groups do become polanzed because of controversial events, the presence of opposing opin-
ions can increase learning as students work together to resolve their differences. See Smith, supra 
note 99, at 63. 
uo See, e.g., Smith, supra note 99, at 65 (noting the institutional benefits of organizing institu-
tions for diversity). 
111 James 0. Freedman On Diversity & Dartmouth, CHANGE, SeptJOct. 1991, at 25, 25 (inter-
view with James 0. Freedman, President of Dartmouth College). 
112 ld. 
113 See NEILL. RUDENSTINE, HARVARD UNIV., THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1993-1995: DlVER· 
SITY AND LEARNING (1995). 
114 ld. at 32-33 (internal citations omitted). 
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and robustness that lead to greater knowledge . . . "115 Therefore, 
affirmative action admissions policies contribute to educational values 
at the core of the mission of higher education institutions.116 
Although many educators have recognized the relationship between 
diversity and quality in education, only recently has a study attempted 
to document that relationship. In What Matters in College,117 Profes-
sor Alexander W. Astin118 examined the impact of diversity on the 
educational experience.119 He analyzed institutional diversity factors 
including universities' emphasis on diversity, research, and course of-
ferings and investigated student experiences such as participation in 
racial and cultural awareness workshops and social interaction with 
students from other racial groups.120 The results of the study indicate 
that "all these institutional and individual environmental experiences 
were associated with greater self-reported gains in cognitive and affec-
tive development (especially increased cultural awareness), with in-
creased satisfaction in most areas of the college experience, and with 
increased commitment to promoting racial understanding."121 Indeed, 
according to Professor Astin, the study demonstrates that "the actual 
effects on student development of emphasizing diversity and of student 
participation in diversity activities are overwhelmingly positive."122 
liS Id. at 53; see also Yolanda T. Moses, Quality, Excellence, and Diversity, in STUDYING 
DIVERSITY, supra note 43, at 9, u (noting the former chancellor of the University of WiSconsin's 
statement that "we cannot have first-class universities without diverse student bodies and staffs" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
116 See RuDENSTINE, supra note n3, at 44· Princeton University President Harold Shapiro 
likewise recognizes the contribution to learning of diverse backgrounds and perspectives. See 
Harold T. Shapiro, Affirmative Action: A Continuing Discussion - A Continuing Commitment, 
PRINCETON WEEKLY BULL., Oct. 16, 1995, at 3, 6 ("Princeton increasingly recognized the educa-
tional value of a learning environment that included students from different backgrounds and 
perspectives."). 
117 AsTIN, supra note 6. 
118 Astin, a professor of higher education and director of the Higher Education Research Insti-
tute at UCLA, is a well-respected expert on higher education. A 1990 survey found that he was 
the most cited author in higher education literature. See John M. Budd, Higher Education Liter-
ature: Characteristics of Citation Patterns, 61 J. OF HIGHER Eouc. 84, 94 tbls. s & 6 (1990). 
119 Astin's study examined 82 outcome measures for approximately 25,ooo students at 217 in-
stitutions who entered college in 1985 and were followed up four years later in 1989. See AsTIN, 
supra note 6, at 21-23; Alexander W. Astin, Diversity and Multiculturalism on the Campus: How 
Are Students Affected?, CHANGE, Mar.!Apr. 1993, at 44, 44· This study corrected some of the 
methodological problems encountered in previous studies by obtaining multi-institutional data and 
isolating student inputs from environmental factors. See ASTIN, supra note 6, at 2-16. 
120 See AsTIN, supra note 6, at 431. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. Some institutions, including Berkeley and Stanford, have found that improved institu-
tional and student involvement is necessary to realize the benefits of the presence of diverse popu-
lations. The Diversity Project, a study by the Institute of Social Change at Berkeley, discovered 
that many students had decided to attend Berkeley because of its history and reputation for di-
versity. See INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE, THE DIVERSITY PROJECT: FINAL 
REPORT 36-37 (1991). The report also noted that most students desired greater interaction with 
students of other races and supported the idea of diversity. See id. at 13; Duster, supra note 99, 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Courts dealing with diversity in higher education face a difficult 
task; they must simultaneously protect academic freedom and ensure 
that educational institutions do not use this freedom to disguise racial 
discrimination. This Note has argued that if a court decides to con-
sider evidence on an institution's interest in diversity, the court should 
not blindly apply the evidentiary requirements that the Supreme Court 
has developed in the context of past discrimination cases. Rather, a 
court should consider the unique nature of diversity in higher educa-
tion and the protection afforded academic decisions. This Note has 
also argued that, in light of the evidence that diversity furthers learn-
ing, courts should treat diversity in higher education as a compelling 
interest. 
This Note has only begun to examine the legality of affirmative 
action programs that seek to achieve diversity in higher education. In 
addition to pursuing a compelling interest, such programs must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve diversity.123 However, courts should real-
ize that admitting a racially diverse student body is often a powerful 
and effective way for a university to fulfill its academic mission. Ulti-
mately, diversity's contribution to higher education is clear: "dialogue 
across diversity can, in the end, nourish wisdom, understanding and 
the increase of justice."I24 
at 240, 242. However, students did have ambivalent reactions to affirmative action. See Duster, 
supra note 99, at 241. The report also found that, although some positive interaction and collec-
tive problem-solving occurred between different races, the present student population was 
experiencing substantial self-segregation. The Diversity Project concluded that greater institu-
tional efforts would be required to reap the full educational benefits of the diverse student body. 
See id. at 236-38. Similarly, a report issued by Stanford's University Committee on Minority 
Issues noted that "[w]ithin the University, minority undergraduates and graduate students directly 
influence our intellectual vigor. The viewpoints and backgrounds brought by different social, ra-
cial, and ethnic groups create a wealth of diversity simply not found on a homogeneous campus." 
UNIVERSITY Cor.m. ON MINORITY IsSUES, STANFORD UNIV., BUILDING A MULTIRACIAL, MUL-
TICULTURAL UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY 55 (1989). However, the Committee also noted the need 
for additional institutional efforts to achieve a more interactive dynamic. See id. at 1-3. 
123 To determine if a program is narrowly tailored, a court must consider "the necessity for 
relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief[;] • • • the 
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant ... market; and the impact of the relief on the 
rights of third parties." United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987). 
124 AMERICAN PLURALISM, supra note 79, at xvii. 
